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Abstract. The problem of manipulation in voting is fundamental and has
received attention in recent research in game theory. In this paper, we con-
sider two cases of manipulation in weighted voting games done by merging
of coalitions into single players and by annexation of a part or all of the
voting weights of another player viewed from two perspectives: of the effect
of swings of players and of the role of the Banzhaf power index. We prove
two theorems for manipulation by merging and annexation, and show sev-
eral attractive properties in these two processes.
1. Introduction. The modern notion of a simple game was introduced
by John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern in their monumental book Theory
of Games and Economic Behavior in 1944 [15]. Previous works on this problem
were fragmentary and did not attract much attention. This book provided some
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new important developments such as the introduction of information sets, the
formal definitions, and the decision rules. According to Von Neumann and Mor-
genstern a simple game is a conflict in which the only objective is winning and the
only rule is an algorithm to decide which coalitions of players are winning. It is
also known that voting is a widely used method for decision making. In particular,
manipulation has been studied intensely in social choice theory, starting with the
classical works of Gibbard [5] and Satterthwaite [10]. The problem of coalitional
manipulation was first explicitly introduced by Conitzer, Sandholm and Lang [3],
where the authors initiated its analysis from a computational perspective.
The aim of this paper is to show two processes of manipulation in weighted
voting games: by merging of two players into a single player and by annexation
of a part or all of the voting weights of another player.
We start our study with a consideration of key terms. Let N be a
nonempty finite set of players in game G and every subset S ⊂ N be referred to
as a coalition. The set N is called the grand coalition and ∅ is called the empty
coalition. We denote the collection of all coalitions by 2N and the number of
players of coalition S ⊂ N by |S|. Let us label the players by 1, 2, . . . , n, i. e.,
n = |N | ≥ 2.
Definition 1. A simple game in characteristic-function form is a pair
G = (N, v) where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of players and v : 2N → {0, 1} is
the characteristic function which satisfies the following three conditions:
(1) v(∅) = 0;
(2) v(N) = 1;
(3) v is monotonic, i. e., if S ⊂ T ⊂ N , then v(S) ≤ v(T ).
Thus we formalize the idea of coalition decision making. From the above definition
it follows that the characteristic function v for a coalition S ⊂ N indicates the
value of S. This means that for each coalition S ⊂ N we have either v(S) = 0 or
v(S) = 1.
In this paper, we will consider a special class of simple games called
weighted voting games (or weighted majority games) with a dichotomous vot-
ing rule—acceptance (“yes”) or rejection (“no”). These games have been found
to be well-suited to model economic or political bodies that exercise some kind
of control. A weighted voting game is a type of simple cooperative game and a
formal model of coalition decision making in which decisions are made by vote.
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A weighted voting game (N, v) is described by G = [q;w1, w2, . . . , wn]
where q and w1, w2, . . . , wn are nonnegative integer numbers such that
q ≤
n∑
k=1
wk = τ.
The set of weights {w1, w2, . . . , wn} corresponds to the set of players {1, 2, . . . , n}.
For more information see [9], [12] and [14]. This game has the following properties:
(1) 1 ≤ q ≤ τ ;
(2) n = |N | ≥ 2 is the number of players;
(3) wi ≥ 0 is the number of votes of player i ∈ N ;
(4) q is the needed quota so that a coalition can win;
(5) the symbol [q;w1, w2, . . . , wn] represents the weighted voting gameG defined
by either v(S) = 1 when
∑
k∈S
wk ≥ q or v(S) = 0 when
∑
k∈S
wk < q for
coalition S ⊂ N .
For any weighted voting game G, the form [q;w1, w2, . . . , wn] is often
called a weighted presentation of game G. Obviously, one weighted voting game
has many representations. For example, the following three weighted voting games
G1 = [51; 49, 49, 2], G2 = [9; 7, 6, 5], and G3 = [2; 1, 1, 1] represent the same voting
rule—majority rule, that is, each coalition of 2 or 3 players is winning. It follows
that they have the same characteristic functions.
2. Definitions and concepts. We first introduce a definition for two
basic types of coalitions—winning and losing.
Definition 2. For any coalition S ⊂ N in game G, S is winning if and
only if v(S) = 1, and S is losing if and only if v(S) = 0. The collections of
all winning and all losing coalitions in game G are denoted by W (G) and L(G),
respectively. If game G is fixed, we simply write W and L.
By definition, any simple game has winning and losing coalitions, and this
game is determined by the set of all its winning or losing coalitions. We have
that N ∈ W and ∅ ∈ L; therefore, W and L are nonempty, W
⋂
L = ∅ and
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W
⋃
L = 2N . Observe that a coalition having a winning sub-coalition is also
winning and a sub-coalition of a losing coalition is also losing.
It is important to note that if the quota increases (decreases), then the set
of all winning coalitions decreases (increases) and the set of all losing coalitions
increases (decreases).
For any player i ∈ N , the collection of all winning coalitions including i
is denoted by W i+, the collection of all winning coalitions excluding i is denoted
by W i−, the collection of all losing coalitions including i is denoted by L
i
+, and
the collection of all losing coalitions excluding i is denoted by Li−.
Definition 3. For any coalition S ∈ W , S is called a minimal winning
coalition if and only if S \ {i} is not winning for all i ∈ S. The collection of
all minimal winning coalitions is denoted by MW . For any player i ∈ N , the
collection of all minimal winning coalitions including i is denoted by MW i+ and
the collection of all minimal winning coalitions excluding i is denoted by MW i−.
It is easy to prove that MW and W are two finite sets, MW ⊂ W and
MW is nonempty.
Thus, a simple game (N, v) can alternatively be defined in winning-set
form as (N,W ) or minimal-winning-set form as (N,MW ).
Definition 4. A player who does not belong to any minimal winning
coalition is called a dummy, i. e., player i ∈ N is a dummy if and only if i ∈ N \S
for all S ∈MW . A player who belongs to all minimal winning coalitions is called
a veto player or vetoer, i. e., player i ∈ N has the capacity to veto if and only if
i ∈ S for all S ∈MW . A player i ∈ N is a dictator if and only if {i} is a winning
coalition.
In voting power theory, a dummy player has no decision power, a veto
player can block every decisions and a dictator has all of the decision power.
For any player i ∈ N , it is easy to show that MW i+ = ∅ is equivalent to
player i being a dummy, and MW i+ =MW is equivalent to player i being a veto
player.
In the following example we illustrate that there exists a simple game that
it is not a weighted voting game.
Example 1. [6, Example 5.12.4] Consider simple game G given by N =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and MW = {{1, 2.3}, {4, 5}}. Let us assume that there exist a
quota q and weights w1, w2, w3, w4, w5 such that G is a weighted voting game.
This means that w1 + w2 + w3 ≥ q and w4 + w5 ≥ q. As a result we obtain
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q > w1+w2+w4 ≥ q−w3+w4; therefore, we have that w3 > w4. Thus, we find
that {3, 5} ∈ W , but {3}, {5} ∈ L. It follows that {3, 5} ∈MW . This leads to a
contradiction; therefore, G is not a weighted voting game.
Definition 5. A weighted voting game G is called proper if and only if
v(S) + v(N \ S) ≤ 1 for all S ⊂ N .
Note that a weighted voting game to be proper is equivalent to the com-
plement of a winning coalition to be not winning. This means that in a proper
game coalitions S and N \ S cannot both be winning. In this context, if S is
winning, then N \ S is losing, but the converse statement is not always true.
Clearly, the following statements are true:
(1) A proper game may have only one dictator and all other players are dum-
mies. However, a proper game may have several veto players while a dictator
is unique. A proper game with two or more veto players does not have a
dictator.
(2) An improper game may have one pair of non-intersecting winning coalitions.
In particular, an improper game may have more than one dictator.
In what follows, we will study proper games with n ≥ 3 only.
Definition 6. A proper game G is called decisive (or strong) if and only
if v(S) + v(N \ S) = 1 for all S ⊂ N .
It is easy to show that weighted voting game [5; 4, 3, 2, 1] is improper, game
[6, 4, 3, 2, 1] is proper but it is not decisive, and game [3; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1] is decisive.
Now we will give the key definition in our paper.
Definition 7. For i ∈ N and S ∈ W i+, player i is called a negative
swing (also critical or pivotal) member of S if and only if S \ {i} is not winning.
The collection of all winning coalitions including i as a negative swing member is
denoted by W is . For i ∈ N and S ∈ Li−, player i is called a positive swing (also
critical or pivotal) member of S if and only if S
⋃
{i} is not losing. The collection
of all losing coalitions including i as a positive swing member is denoted by Lis.
Note that each member of a minimal winning coalition is a negative swing
player, a winning coalition may have a negative swing member and a losing coali-
tion may have a positive swing member.
It is often said that |W is | and |Lis| are the number of swings of player
i ∈ N .
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Remark 1. In classical theory each positive swing for player i ∈ N
corresponds to a pair of coalitions (S, S ∪ {i}) ∈ Li− ×W i+ such that S is losing
and S ∪ {i} is winning (L → W process), and each negative swing for player i
corresponds to a pair of coalitions (S \ {i}, S) ∈ Li− ×W i+ such that S \ {i} is
losing and S is winning (L←W process). In the first case we say that player i is
a swing member of the pair (S, S ∪ {i}), but in the second case we say that that
player i is a swing member of the pair (S \ {i}, S).
It is easy to show that if a weighted voting game has a dictator, then
he/she is the only swing player in this game.
Theorem 1 [2, Corollary 4.1]. For any proper game, |W is | = |Lis| for all
i ∈ N .
Remark 2. It is important to note that in the proof of Theorem 1 the
authors construct a one-to-one mappingmi :W is → Lis such that coalition S ∈W is
only corresponds to coalition S \ {i} ∈ Lis and conversely, coalition S \ {i} ∈ Lis
only corresponds to coalition S ∈W is . See also Remark 1.
3. Decision powers of the players. The concept of decision power of
the players in weighted voting games is well-known. For example, let us consider a
game G = [51; 62, 27, 11]. We may be tempted to say that player 1 has
62
100
of the
decision power, players 2 and 3 have
27
100
and
11
100
, respectively. But this is not
true because player 1 has
100
100
of the power, and players 2 and 3 are powerless,
i. e., player 1 is a dictator and players 2 and 3 are dummies. Weighted voting
games use mathematical models to analyze the distribution of decision power of
the players. These distributions of decision power are central in economics and
political science.
These notes allow us to discuss the Banzhaf power index. This index was
introduced by the American legal activist and law professor John Banzhaf III
in 1965 as a measure of the real power of players in a cooperative game [1]. It
depends on the number of ways in which each player can affect a negative swing.
The absolute Banzhaf index concerns the number of times each player i ∈ N
could change a coalition from winning to losing and it requires that we know the
number of negative swings for each player i. For each player i ∈ N , the absolute
Banzhaf index is denoted by ηi and it equals the number of negative swings for
this player.
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Theorem 2 [4] [7, Lemma 1]. For any proper game ηi = |W is | = |W i+|−
|W i−| for all i ∈ N .
As a corollary of Theorem 2 we also obtain ηi = |W i+| − (|W | − |W i+|) =
2|W i+| − |W | for all i ∈ N and ηi − ηj = 2(|W i+| − |W j+|) for all i, j ∈ N . Thus,
we also have that ηi ≡ ηj modulo 2 for all i, j ∈ N .
Example 2. Consider a weighted voting game [7; 3, 3, 1, 1]. The collec-
tions of all winning and all minimal winning coalitions areW = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4},
{1, 2, 3, 4}} and MW = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}}, respectively. The swings of player 1
correspond to three pairs of coalitions ({2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}), ({2, 4}, {1, 2, 4}) and
({2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}), i. e., we get that η1 = 3, see Remark 1. Similarly, we obtain
η2 = 3, η3 = 1 and η4 = 1.
Remark 3. From Theorems 1 and 2 it follows that ηi = |W is | = |Lis|
for all i ∈ N , i. e., ηi is either the number of negative swings or the number of
positive swings of player i.
The normalized Banzhaf power index is the vector
−→
β = (β1, β2, . . . , βn),
given by βi =
ηi∑n
k=1 ηk
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
The Banzhaf index is similar to the Penrose–Banzhaf (or Banzhaf–Cole-
man) index which is defined by bi =
ηi
2n−1
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The Banzhaf index
was originally created in 1946 by Leonel Penrose, but was reintroduced by John
Banzhaf in 1965.
Theorem 3 [11, Theorem 2]. For any proper game, player i ∈ N being
a dummy is equivalent to ηi = 0.
Remark 4. It is important to note that the Banzhaf power index is
monotonic with respect to the weights when we are evaluating the power, i. e., for
two different players i, j ∈ N , ηi = ηj when wi = wj and ηi ≥ ηj when wi > wj ,
see Theorem 3 and [4].
Theorem 4 [11, Theorem 2(b)]. For any proper game if i, j ∈ N , i 6= j,
player i is a dummy and wi ≥ wj , then player j is also a dummy.
4. Concepts for manipulation by merging, splitting and an-
nexation. Weighted voting games are cooperative games; therefore, the analysis
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of manipulation is natural. The study of methods of manipulation has practical
applications as well. Decision rules in voting games can be manipulated by coali-
tions merging into single players and players splitting into a number of smaller
units [8]. Decision rules can also be manipulated by annexation of a part or all of
the weights of other players.
First, we will focus our attention on manipulation by merging, that is,
two or more different players merge into a single player. Consider a proper
weighted voting game G = [q;w1, w2, . . . , wn]. We construct a new game G′ =
[q;w′1, w
′
2, . . . , w
′
n′ ] such that n > n
′, each player i′ in game G′ is a fixed coalition
of one or more players in game G and its weight w′i′ is the sum of the weights of
this fixed coalition. The quota and the total sum of the weights remain the same.
We denote the set of all players in games G and G′ by N and N ′, respectively.
Game G′ is called a derivative game of the original game G. For more information
see [13].
Example 3. LetG = [5; 4, 3, 1, 1] be an original game. For the derivative
game G′, let the coalition of players 2 and 4 in game G be a new player in game
G′ (players 2 and 4 merge into a single player and it is player 2′) and the other
players remain the same. Thus, we get the derivative game G′ = [5; 4, 4, 1].
Second, we will consider manipulation by splitting, that is, a player splits
into a number of smaller different players. Consider a proper weighted voting
game G = [q;w1, w2, . . . , wn]. We construct a new game G′ = [q;w′1, w
′
2, . . . , w
′
n′ ]
such that n < n′, each player i in game G splits into one or more players in game
G′ and the weight wi of player i in game G is the sum of the weights of the split
players in game G′. The quota and the total sum of the weights remain the same.
Game G′ is called a derivative game of the original game G. In the other words,
game G transforms to game G′ by the splitting of player i into players i′ and j′,
wi = w
′
i′ + w
′
j′ while the other players remain the same.
Example 4. Let G = [5; 4, 4, 1] be an original game. For the derivative
game G′, let player 2 in game G split into two players with weights 3 and 1,
while the other players remain the same. Thus, we get the derivative game G′ =
[5; 4, 3, 1, 1].
It is necessary to note that the converse process of manipulation by merg-
ing is the process of manipulation by splitting, see Examples 3 and 4.
Finally, we will discuss manipulation by annexation, that is, a player an-
nexes a part or all of the voting weights of other players. Consider a proper
weighted voting game G = [q;w1, w2, . . . , wn]. We construct a new game G′ =
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[q;w′1, w
′
2, . . . , w
′
n′ ] such that n = n
′, fix two different players i and j in game G,
player i annexes a part or all of the voting weights of player j, i. e., player i’s new
weight is w′i = wi + t and player j’s new weight is w
′
j = wj − t for wj ≥ t > 0. In
other words, player i takes t votes from player j and the other players remain the
same. Game G′ is called a derivative game of the original game G.
Example 5. LetG = [6; 4, 3, 2, 1] be an original game. For the derivative
game G′, let player 1 with weight 4 in game G annex one vote of player 3 with
weight 2. As a result we get that player 1 has weight 5, player 3 has weight 1
and the other players remain the same. Thus, we get the derivative game G′ =
[6; 5, 3, 1, 1].
It is interesting to note that one player can consecutively annex a part or
all of the voting weights of several players.
5. Main result. In this section, we present two basic theorems; first,
for manipulation by merging of two players into a single player, and second, for
manipulation by annexation of a part or all of the voting weights of another player.
The original version of the first theorem can be seen in [13]. Here we
give the two theorems with their proofs because they are connected and logically
complementary.
Theorem 5. Transform game G to game G′ by merging two different
players i and j into player i′, and the other players remaining the same. The
following statements are true.
(a) ηi + ηj = 2η′i′ , |W is(G))|+ |W js (G)| = 2|W i
′
s (G
′)| and |Lis(G))|+ |Ljs(G)| =
2|Li′s (G′)|.
(b) If player j is a dummy in game G, then ηi = 2η′i′ , |W is(G))| = 2|W i
′
s (G
′)|
and |Lis(G))| = 2|Li
′
s (G
′)|.
(c) Players i and j being dummies in game G is equivalent to player i′ being a
dummy in game G′.
(d) If wi = wj , then 2wi = w′i′ , ηi = η
′
i′ , |W is(G))| = |W i
′
s (G
′)| and |Lis(G))| =
|Li′s (G′)|.
(e) If k 6= i, j and player k in game G transforms to player k′ in game G′, then
ηk ≥ η′k′ , |W ks (G))| ≥ |W k
′
s (G
′)| and |Lks(G))| ≥ |Lk
′
s (G
′)|.
68 Zdravko D. Slavov, Christina S. Evans
(f) If player i′ is a dummy in game G′, then βi + βj = β′i′ = 0.
(g) If player i′ is not a dummy in game G′, then βi + βj < 2β′i′ .
(h) If wj ≤ wi and player i′ is not a dummy in game G′, then βj < β′i′ .
(i) If player i is a dictator in game G, then player i′ is a dictator in game G′
and βi + βj = β
′
i′ = 1.
P r o o f.
(a) Let S ∈ Li′s (G′), wi+wj = w′i′ and let us assume that wj ≤ wi. This means
that 0 < q −
∑
h∈S
wh ≤ w′i′ = wj + wi and S ∪ {i′} ∈W (G′).
There are three cases for positive swings of each player i, j or i′.
Case 1. If 0 < q−
∑
h∈S
wh ≤ wj , then q ≤
∑
h∈S
wh+wj and q ≤
∑
h∈S
wh+wi. As
a result we see that player i′ is a swing member of the pair (S, S∪{i′}) in
game G′, and players j and i are swing members of the pairs (S, S∪{j})
and (S, S ∪ {i}) in game G, respectively. Hence, in this case we have
ηi + ηj = 2η
′
i′ .
Case 2. If wj < q −
∑
h∈S
wh ≤ wi, then wj +
∑
h∈S
wh < q ≤
∑
h∈S
wh + wi.
Here we get that player i′ is a swing member of the pair (S, S ∪ {i′})
in game G′, and players j and i are swing members of the pairs ((S ∪
{i}) \ {j}, S ∪ {i}) and (S, S ∪ {i}) in game G, respectively. We also
obtain ηi + ηj = 2η′i′ .
Case 3. If wi < q−
∑
h∈S
wh ≤ w′i′ , then wi+
∑
h∈S
wh < q ≤
∑
h∈S
wh+wi+wj .
So we have that player i′ is a swing member of the pair (S, S ∪ {i′})
in game G′, and players j and i are swing members of the pairs ((S ∪
{i})\{j}, S∪{i}) and ((S∪{j})\{i}, S∪{j}) in game G, respectively.
Here we get ηi + ηj = 2η′i′ too.
In summary, we obtain ηi + ηj = 2η′i′ . From ηi = |W is(G)| = |Lis(G)|,
ηj = |W js (G)| = |Ljs(G)| and η′i′ = |W i
′
s (G
′)| = |Li′s (G′)| it follows that
|W is(G))|+ |W js (G)| = 2|W i
′
s (G
′)| and |Lis(G))|+ |Ljs(G)| = 2|Li
′
s (G
′)|.
(b) If player j is a dummy, then set W js (G) is empty, see Theorem 3. Accord-
ing to (a) we get that ηi = 2η′i′ , |W is(G))| = 2|W i
′
s (G
′)| and |Lis(G))| =
2|Li′s (G′)|.
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(c) This is immediate from (a) and Theorem 3.
(d) The proof follows from (a).
(e) Let us consider a player k′ ∈ N ′ in game G′ such that k′ 6= i′ and coalition
S ∈ Lk′s (G′). This means that S ∈ Lks(G); therefore, we obtain |Lks(G)| ≥
|Lk′s (G′)|. It also follows that ηk ≥ η′k′ and |W ks (G))| ≥ |W k
′
s (G
′)|.
(f) If player i′ is a dummy, then set W i
′
s (G
′) is empty, see Theorem 3. This
means that |W i′s (G′)| = 0, i. e., β′i′ = 0. Thus we find that βi = βj = 0;
therefore, βi + βj = β′i′ = 0.
(g) If player i′ is not a dummy, then η′i′ > 0. Clearly, we have that ηi + ηj =
2η′i′ > 0, 2η
′
i′ > η
′
i′ and ηi > 0 or ηj > 0, see (a) and (f).
Applying now (a) and (e) we calculate that
βi + βj =
ηi + ηj∑
h∈N ηh
=
ηi + ηj
ηi + ηj +
∑
h∈N\{i,j} ηh
≤ 2η
′
i′
2η′i′ +
∑
h∈N\{i′} η
′
h
<
2η′i′
η′i′ +
∑
h∈N ′ η
′
h
< 2β′i′ .
Finally, we obtain βi + βj < 2β′i′ .
(h) Remark 4 implies βj ≤ βi; therefore, we find that 2βj ≤ βi+βj < 2β′i′ , i. e.,
βj < β
′
i′ .
(i) If player i is a dictator in game G, then the other players in game G are
dummies. These players are dummies in game G′ too, see (a), (e) and (f).
Hence, player i′ is a dictator in game G′. As a result we obtain βj = 0,
βi = β
′
i′ = 1 and βi + βj = β
′
i′ = 1.
Now we show the following two examples for merging a coalition of three
players into one player.
Example 6. [13] Let G = [17; 8, 7, 4, 4, 2, 1, 1] be an original game with
n = 7, q = 17 and τ = 27. For the derivative game G′, let the coalition of
players 2, 3 and 5 in game G be a new player in game G′ and the other players
remain the same. So we get G′ = [17; 13, 8, 4, 1, 1] where n′ = 5, q′ = 17, τ ′ = 27,
1′ = {2, 3, 5}, 2′ = {1}, 3′ = {4}, 4′ = {6} and 5′ = {7}. The sum of the Banzhaf
power indices of players 2, 3 and 5 in game G is β2+β3+β5 = 0, 4851 but the index
of player 1′ in game G′ is β′1′ = 0, 6000. As a result we obtain β2+ β3+ β5 < β
′
1′ .
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Example 7. [13] Let G = [30; 9, 8, 5, 5, 4, 3, 1] be an original game with
n = 7, q = 30 and τ = 35. For the derivative game G′, let the coalition of players
1, 2 and 3 in game G be a new player in game G′ and the other players remain the
same. In this case we get G′ = [30; 22, 5, 4, 3, 1] where n′ = 5, q′ = 30, τ ′ = 35,
1′ = {1, 2, 3}, 2′ = {4}, 3′ = {5}, 4′ = {6} and 5′ = {7}. Here the sum of the
Banzhaf power indices of players 1, 2 and 3 in game G is β1+β2+β3 = 0, 5789 but
the index of player 1′ in gameG′ is β′1′ = 0, 3684. Now we obtain β1+β2+β3 > β
′
1′ .
Note that in Example 6 decision power increases but in Example 7 it
decreases.
Theorem 6. Transform game G to game G′ such that player i annexes
t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , wj} voters of player j and the other players remain the same. The
following statements are true.
(a) ηi(G′) ≥ ηi(G) and ηj(G′) ≤ ηj(G).
(b) ηi(G′)− ηi(G) = ηj(G)− ηj(G′).
(c) If player j is a dummy in game G and wj > 0, then player j is a dummy in
game G′ and ηi(G′) = ηi(G).
(d) Players i and j being dummies in game G is equivalent to these two players
i and j being dummies in game G′.
(e) If player i is a vetoer in game G, then player i is a vetoer in game G′.
(f) If player i is a dictator in game G, then player i is a dictator in game G′.
P r o o f.
(a) Let S ∈ Lis(G), i. e., S ∈ Li−(G) and S ∪ {i} ∈ W i+(G). This means that
0 < q−
∑
h∈S
wh ≤ wi. From w′i = wi+ t > wi it follows 0 < q−
∑
h∈S
wh < w
′
i;
therefore, S ∈ Li−(G′) and S ∪ {i} ∈ W i+(G′). As a result we obtain S ∈
Lis(G
′) and ηi(G′) ≥ ηi(G).
By analogy with the above, let S ∈ Ljs(G′), i. e., S ∈ Lj−(G′) and S ∪
{j} ∈ W j+(G′). So, 0 < q −
∑
h∈S
wh ≤ w′j < wj implies S ∈ Lj−(G) and
S ∪ {j} ∈W i+(G). In this case we find that ηj(G′) ≤ ηj(G).
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(b) Let us transform game G to game G1 by merging players i and j into
player i′ and the other players be the same. Now, if we transform game G′
to game G2 by merging players i and j into player i′ and the other players
remain the same, then we obtain G1 = G2. According to Theorem 5(a) we
obtain ηi(G) + ηj(G) = 2ηi′(G1) = 2ηi′(G2) = ηi(G′) + ηj(G′). Finally, we
get that ηi(G′)− ηi(G) = ηj(G)− ηj(G′).
(c) Let player j be a dummy in game G and wj > 0. From (a) and (b) it follows
ηi(G
′)− ηi(G) = ηj(G)− ηj(G′) ≥ 0. This means that player j is a dummy
in game G′ and ηi(G′) = ηi(G).
(d) The proof follows from (c).
(e) If player i is a vetoer in game G, then τ − q < wi. From w′i = wi + t and
t > 0 it follows that player i is a vetoer in game G′.
(f) If player i is a dictator in game G, then q ≤ wi. By analogy, w′i = wi + t
and t > 0 imply player i is a dictator in game G′.
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